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imbalance between monetary and economic policy. Experience shows that such a model was based on wrong assumptions. 3 First, the coordination of economic policies did not lead to convergence between Member States (on the contrary, the first decade of the euro led to more macroeconomic divergences between countries) because soft law is too soft to force a state to change its policies. Second, the prohibition of solidarity did not lead to different risk premiums according to national public finances (on the contrary, the spreads on government bonds nearly disappear between the countries of the euro area). This is because financial markets were imperfect and the prohibition was not credible given the massive spillover effects a bankruptcy of one country has on the other members of the currency zone. Third, the fiscal surveillance did not lead to reduction of government debts and deficit below EU limits because the sanctions were decided by political institutions and not independent courts. In brief, the recent eurocrisis shows that governance through market discipline and rules applied by political entities does not work.
Hence, this crisis calls for a fundamental revision of the economic governance. The most radical option would have been to integrate economic policy at EU level, as was done for monetary policy 20 years ago. This was not politically feasible as it implied a political integration that Member States were still not ready to accept. The alternative was to build on the existing governance model and improve it. This option was followed by the recent reforms which took place in several steps decided by the European council with hesitation and sometimes reluctance under the heavy pressure of financial markets (see table 1 inserted at the end of this contribution). 4 In 2010, the council adopted a regulation establishing the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the Member States of the eurozone established the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), two instruments for financial assistance. Then, based on the conclusions of a high-level task force set up by the European council at the beginning of the crisis, 5 the council and the European Parliament adopted the six-pack in 2011, 6 a set of five regulations and one directive, to strengthen fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance. In 2012, the Member States of the euro area concluded the treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (tESM), a permanent financial instrument to replace the temporary EFSF and EFSM. That same year, 25 Member States concluded the treaty on Stability, coordination and Governance in the EMU (tScG) to again strengthen fiscal surveillance. In 2013, the council and the European Parliament 3 J.V. Louis, 'Guest editorial: The no-bail out clause and rescue package ', 47 CMLRev. (2010), p. 971-986. 4 d. Adamski, 'National Power Games and Structural Failures in the European Macroeconomic Governance ', 49 CMLRev. (2012 ', 49 CMLRev. ( ), p. 1319 ', 49 CMLRev. ( -1364 N. de Sadeleer, ' The New Architecture of the European Economic Governance: A Leviathan or a Flat-Footed colossus? ', 19 MJ (2012), p. 354-382. 5 This task-force was composed of the finance ministers of the Member States, the commissioner for economic and monetary affairs and the Ecb President and chaired by the European council President Van rompuy: Final report of 21 october 2010 by task Force on Economic Governance, doc. 15 302/10 which was endorsed by the European council of october 2010. 6 The six-pack was published in oJ [2011] L 306. Most of its provisions entered into force on 13 december 2011.
adopted the two-pack, a set of two regulations, which apply only to the Member States whose currency is the euro, to further strengthen fiscal surveillance and incorporate some provisions of the tScG into the EU legal framework. 7 reforms will continue. 8 In particular, there are now proposals to develop more binding legal instruments for the coordination of economic policies.
This flood of legal instruments substantially improves the economic governance. regarding the coordination of economic policy, there was little direct change as coordination continues to be based on soft law instruments and the open Method of coordination, but the other reforms of governance indirectly impact the coordination and economic convergence. Solidarity is where the most radical changes took place, as financial assistance can now be provided upon conditions (to ensure that Member States run sustainable fiscal policies and that the EMU does not become a transfer Union). regarding fiscal surveillance, the rules have been made smarter and the sanctions more automatic. Moreover, a new pillar of the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances has also been set up. 9 While they strengthen integration, the recent reforms also increase the substantive and institutional differentiation between the countries which are part of the euro area and those which are outside. 10 Such differentiation is based on an extensive interpretation of the new legal basis introduced by the Lisbon treaty, in particular, Article 136 tFEU. 11 This increased differentiation, combined with the recent understanding of the political consequences of a common currency, casts doubt on the first fundamental choice made in Maastricht, id est, the euro must be the currency of all the Member States. Already at that time, two Member States, the United Kingdom and denmark, opted out of the euro. Now, voices are advocating to build a 'two-speed Europe', of which one could be based on the common currency. 12 The euro-crisis also led to a fundamental overhaul of the EU regulation of the financial sector. In 2010, three authorities were established for micro-prudential oversight: the European banking Authority (EbA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and occupational Pension Authority (EIoPA) as well as one board for macro-prudential oversight: the European Systemic risk board (ESrb): see [2010] oJ L 331. In 2013, a Single Supervisory Mechanism was established at the Ecb. 10 For an analysis of the integration and the differentiation in the EMU, see F. Snyder, 'EMU -Integration and differentiation: Metaphor for European Union', in P. craig and G. de burca (eds.) Thus today, economic governance is based on four pillars (see table 2 at the end of this contribution), each with its own objectives and methods, with strong differentiation between the countries which are in the eurozone and those which are outside. The first pillar establishes fiscal rules and surveillance according to a 'UN regime'. 13 The second pillar sets up a macroeconomic surveillance, also according to a 'UN regime'. The third pillar establishes coordination of economic and social policies according to a 'hyperoEcd regime'. The fourth pillar organizes financial solidarity among Member States according to an 'IMF regime'. Those four pillars are based on nearly 20 legal instruments with different legal natures, as some are within the EU legal framework and others are outside that framework. 14 This contribution describes and identifies the main trends in the evolution of the four economic governance pillars, and then conjectures their impact on the transformation of EU law on the basis of the questions raised by the editors of this anniversary issue. §2. FIrSt PILLAr: FIScAL SUrVEILLANcE
The first pillar of economic governance aims to control, and if necessary correct, the fiscal imbalances of the Member States. It is made of a triptych: budgetary rules, an annual surveillance procedure and correction mechanisms at the EU and national levels.
originally, this pillar was based on the tFEU and the Stability and Growth Pact made of two council regulations and one European council resolution. 15 In 2005, after its violation by France and Germany, the pact was reformed to make its rules smarter and its procedures more flexible. 16 In 2011, after the eurocrisis, the pact was reformed again to make the procedure more stringent and the sanctions more automatic. 17 also complemented by a directive on national fiscal frameworks. 18 For the eurozone Members, the pact was also complemented by one regulation adopted in 2011 to increase the possibilities of sanction 19 and by another regulation adopted in 2013 to enhance the commission and council's oversight over national public finances. 20 In 2012, 25 Member States concluded the treaty on Stability, coordination and Governance in the EMU (tScG), an international treaty outside the legal framework of the EU to again reinforce fiscal surveillance. 21 An international treaty was necessary because some Member States, notably Germany, favoured a treaty to strengthen fiscal surveillance but the United Kingdom made the revision of EU treaties conditional upon requirements which were not acceptable to other Member States. 22
A. FIScAL rULES
Since the beginning of the EMU in 1992, the tFEU has imposed two simple limits on national public finances. 23 The first limit requires that Member States maintain their effective deficits below 3% of GdP, unless either the ratio declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to 3%, or, alternatively, the excess over 3% is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to 3%. The second limit requires that Member States maintain their debts below 60% of GdP, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching 60% at a satisfactory pace. However, as events showed, those rules were too simple and too narrowly focused.
In 2003, the two largest eurozone countries, France and Germany, violated the deficit rule and managed to convince a blocking minority within the council to reject the sanctions proposed by the commission. They argued that the deficit rule was so simple that it was stupid (as the previous commission President Prodi put it) because it did not sufficiently take into account the specific situation of each country, nor the economic cycle. That led to the first reform of the Stability and Growth Pact regulation introducing a new and smarter fiscal rule to ensure the sustainability of public finances, the country-specific Medium term objective (Mto). This is a target for the structural deficit (id est, the effective deficit corrected for the effects of the economic cycle as well as the one-off and temporary fiscal measures) in the medium term (id est, 3 years), which is determined for each Member State according to its explicit and implicit government debt. In 2005, the revised Stability and Growth Pact provides that the Mto should be comprised of between -1% of GdP and balance or surplus. 24 In 2012, the tScG went further and provided that the Mto cannot go below -0.5% of GdP (unless the ratio of government debt is below 60% of GdP and the risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances are low). 25 Successive reforms also introduced an adjustment path when a Member State is violating fiscal rules. on the one hand, if a Member State has not reached its Mto, it must reduce its structural deficit by at least 0.5% of GdP per year (or more if the Member State has a government debt above 60% of GdP or presents pronounced risks of overall debt sustainability). 26 There is an escape clause in the case of an unusual event outside the control of the Member State which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or in periods of severe economic downturn for the euro area or the Union as a whole. 27 on the other hand, if a Member State has not reached the debt ceiling, it must reduce the difference between the actual debt level and the authorized 60% of GdP threshold at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark. 28 Finally, the recent reforms have increased the national ownership of the rules. The six-pack provides that each Member State should have, in national law, numerical fiscal rules which effectively promote compliance with EU government deficit and debt limits. 29 The tScG goes further by imposing on the contracting Parties the transposition into national law of the Mto rule and its adjustment path through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected throughout the national budgetary processes. 
b. ANNUAL SUrVEILLANcE ProcEdUrE
Since the beginning of the EMU, the tFEU and then the Stability and Growth Pact have organized an annual multilateral surveillance procedure. Each year, each Member State submits a stability (if their currency is the euro) or a convergence (if their currency is not the euro) programme describing the expected evolution of its public finances. 31 After examination, the commission proposes country-specific budgetary recommendations, which are adopted by the council by qualified majority.
Initially, those council recommendations were fully applied by the Member States because they were afraid they would not be admitted to the eurozone if their public finances were not compliant with EU fiscal limits. After the accession to the monetary zone, the effectiveness of surveillance weakened substantially, as the Member States did not fear exclusion from the euro area. to regain effectiveness, the procedure was reformed, especially for the eurozone countries, in three ways. First, the powers of the commission were enhanced. The Lisbon treaty made it possible for the commission to address warnings directly to Member States 32 and, then, the six-pack introduced a 'comply or explain' rule where the council should follow commission proposals as a rule, or explain its position publicly. 33 Second, the effects of recommendations were strengthened. The sixpack introduced the possibility of sanctions (an interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% of GdP) when preventive budgetary recommendations are not applied by the eurozone countries. 34 Third, the timespan of EU oversight over national fiscal policies was extended. The twopack imposed on eurozone countries the submission of draft budgetary plans each year in october, and gave the commission the right to comment on, or in case of serious noncompliance with EU fiscal rules, to request a revision of those plans. 35 
c. corrEctIVE MEcHANISMS
If, despite the annual surveillance, a Member State does not comply with fiscal rules, EU law foresees corrective mechanisms at the EU level (the excessive deficit procedure), and at the national level. 
At the EU level: the excessive deficit procedure
When the EMU was created, the tFEU and then the Stability and Growth Pact established an EU corrective procedure with extensive oversight from the commission and council when a Member State violates fiscal rules. The commission proposes the opening of the procedure, and a decision is made by the council by qualified majority. 36 The council also adopts a budgetary recommendation setting a date for correction (id est, when government effective deficit should be below 3%) and a correction path. If the Member State concerned does not comply with the corrective recommendations, the commission proposes, and the council decides on, the stepping up of the procedure which may end up with the imposition of sanctions (from more transparency, to limiting EIb intervention, to a non-interest bearing deposit, to a fine of 0.5% GdP).
Although the excessive deficit procedure was quickly applied after the introduction of the euro, the original procedure was prone to political bargaining. In 2003, the commission proposed to step up the excessive deficit procedure against France and Germany, but was not followed by the council due to intense lobbying by both countries. Instead, the council relaxed the budgetary recommendations addressed to France and Germany. 37 The commission sought the annulment of the council actions at the court of Justice, but partly lost the case. 38 As already explained, this case triggered the first reform of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2005 with, among others, the introduction of a stricter timeline for the different steps of the EdP.
In 2010, the euro crisis showed that the excessive deficit procedure had not been effective in preventing some Member States from running unsustainable fiscal policies. This led to additional reforms of the excessive deficit procedure in the same three ways as for the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. First, the powers of the commission were enhanced. The six-pack imposed the 'comply or explain' rule for the proposals made by the commission during the excessive deficit procedure. 39 It also provided that the newly created financial sanctions must be decided by the council by reverse qualified majority. Then, the tScG foresaw that the existing sanctions of the tFEU must also be decided by reverse qualified majority. 40 Second, the effects of corrective recommendations were strengthened. The six-pack introduced additional and earlier sanctions in case of noncompliance by the eurozone countries. 41 Third, the EU oversight has been reinforced. The tScG and the two-pack imposed on eurozone countries are subject to an excessive 36 Article 126(6) and 126(13) tFEU. Article 139(4b) tFEU provides that when the EdP is decided against a eurozone country, only the other eurozone countries may vote. deficit procedure, the submission of an economic partnership programme describing the policy measures and structural reforms necessary to correct the excessive deficit. 42
At national level: the automatic correction mechanism
Initially, EU law did not explicitly require the establishment of a national correction mechanism for the violation of EU fiscal rules. That contributed to the lack of national ownership of the EU constraints. to remedy this weakness, the six-pack required that national fiscal laws contain effective and timely monitoring of compliance with the rules based on a reliable analysis carried out by an independent body, as well as the consequences of non-compliance. 43 Going further, the tScG required the establishment of a national correction mechanism to be triggered automatically in case of significant deviation from the Mto or the adjustment path towards it. This national correction mechanism is to be based on seven common principles adopted by the commission 44 and included in provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected throughout the national budgetary processes. 45 The transposition is monitored by the commission and is subject to the adjudication of the court of Justice. 46 §3. SEcoNd PILLAr: MAcroEcoNoMIc SUrVEILLANcE originally, the multilateral surveillance focused only on fiscal imbalances and not on other economic imbalances, such as a banking crisis or housing bubble, susceptible to threaten the stability of the eurozone. This weakness was repaired by the six-pack, which introduced a new pillar in the economic governance, mirroring the triptych of the first pillar, with a scoreboard of macroeconomic indicators, an annual surveillance procedure, and a correction procedure. This pillar is based on two regulations adopted in 2011 by the council and the European Parliament, one applicable to all Member States 47 and the other applicable only to the eurozone members. Each year, the commission screens the Member States with the scoreboard. on that basis, the commission adopts an Alert Mechanism report which identifies the countries which are affected or may be affected by imbalances and which need an in-depth review. 50 If after this in-depth review the commission finds macroeconomic imbalances, it proposes countryspecific recommendations, which are adopted by the council by qualified majority. 51 c. EU corrEctIVE ProcEdUrE: ExcESSIVE IMbALANcE ProcEdUrE
If a Member State presents macroeconomic imbalances requiring a correction procedure, the commission proposes the opening of an Excessive Imbalance Procedure which is decided by the council by qualified majority. The council also adopts economic recommendations to correct such imbalances. 52 In this case, the Member State concerned submits a corrective action plan and is subject to extensive oversight from the commission and the council. 53 If the country is part of the eurozone and does not comply with the council's economic recommendations, the commission proposes a financial sanction (a fine of 0.1% of GdP) which is adopted by the council by reverse qualified majority. 54 §4. tHIrd PILLAr: SocIo-EcoNoMIc coordINAtIoN
The third pillar of the economic governance relates to the coordination of national economic and social policies in order, on the one hand, to prevent fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances and, on the other hand, to stimulate growth and jobs in Europe. In 2010, the Europe 2020 Strategy for Growth and Jobs was adopted by the European council to succeed to the Lisbon Strategy. 60 It aims to achieve, by 2020, five headlined targets relating to employment rate, r&d investment, climate change, education and poverty reduction, which have been translated by each Member State in national targets. to achieve those objectives, the council adopted 10 integrated policy guidelines to steer national policies, six broad economic policy guidelines (adopted on the basis of Article 121(2) tFEU) and four Employment Guidelines (adopted on the basis of Article 148(2) tFEU). 61 In addition, two political pacts set complementary guidelines for the coordination of economic and social policies. The Euro Plus Pact, adopted by 23 Member States at the European council of March 2011, provides for structural reforms to enhance competitiveness, employment, the sustainability of the public finances and financial stability. 62 The compact for Growth and Jobs, adopted by all the Member States at the European council of June 2012, provides for national and EU measures to stimulate growth and jobs. 63 Finally, the tScG provides that the contracting Parties undertake to work jointly and take the necessary actions which are essential to the proper functioning of the euro area in pursuit of the objectives of fostering competitiveness, promoting employment, contributing further to the sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability. 64 b. ANNUAL coordINAtIoN At the beginning of the EMU, each policy strategy had its own coordinating method and process which were developed organically according to practical needs. All those methods were streamlined in 2000 by the Lisbon European council with the open Method of coordination comprising four steps: (i) EU guidelines with goals and a timetable; (ii) quantitative and quality indicators and benchmarks; (iii) national action plans with targets and policy reforms; and (iv) periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as a mutual learning process. 65 The coordination of the economic, employment and social policies was then explicitly referred to in the Lisbon treaty. 66 In 2010, the coordination was further improved with the introduction of the European semester 67 which synchronizes the fiscal surveillance (Member States' stability/convergence programmes), the macroeconomic surveillance (commission Alert mechanism report and in-depth review) and the coordination of economic and employment policies (Member States' National reform programmes). It also places the EU surveillance and coordination during the first semester of the year before the adoption of the national budget and policies during the second semester of the year.
The cycle starts with the adoption by the commission of the Annual Growth Survey which sets the priorities for the European Union to achieve growth and jobs. Then, the council and the European Parliament hold debates on the Survey, which leads to the adoption of general orientations by the Spring European council. In April, when it adopts its fiscal convergence/stability programme, each Member State also adopts its National reform Programme indicating the structural reforms already done and to be undertaken in order to achieve its national Europe 2020 targets. After examination, in May the commission proposes country-specific recommendations for each Member State. In July, the council adopts the recommendations, acting by qualified majority and following the 'comply or explain' principle.
The tScG foresees further coordination methods and provides that the contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake are discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. 68 The operationalization of such ex-ante coordination is still under discussion. 69 §5. FoUrtH PILLAr: FINANcIAL SoLIdArItY As already explained, when the EMU was established, financial solidarity between Member States and monetary financing from central banks were prohibited except in very exceptional circumstances. However, when in spring 2010 Greece was at the verge of a bankruptcy which would have had massive effects on the other Member States, the European council decided to provide financial assistance. In May 2010, Member States granted bilateral loans to Greece. 70 Then the council adopted a regulation establishing the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), which is an EU instrument with a lending capacity of 60 billion EUr. 71 As this financial capacity was not enough to be credible but could not be increased because of the small size of the EU budget, Member States of the Eurozone also established, for three years, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which is an intergovernmental special-purpose vehicle with a lending capacity of 440 billion EUr. 72 In parallel, the Ecb adopted the Securities Market Programme (SMP) allowing the purchase of government bonds on the secondary market with a ceiling of 209 billion EUr. 73 Unfortunately, those reforms did not succeed in ending the eurocrisis which expanded to Portugal, Ireland and then Spain, victims of the burst of their housing bubbles and the collapse of their financial systems. In February 2012, the Member States of the euro area concluded the treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (tESM), a permanent international financial institution with a lending capacity of 500 billion EUr to replace the temporary EFSF and EFSM. 74 An international treaty was necessary because EU law does not foresee a legal basis for permanent financial assistance. during the negotiations, Germany requested the revision of Article 136 tFEU to secure the legality of the tESM with regard to EU law. 75 Since then, the court of Justice, sitting as a full court, validated the tESM by adopting a teleological interpretation of Article 125 tFEU. 76 The court imposed three conditions, met by the tESM, to validate an assistance mechanism: (i) the beneficiary state remains responsible for its commitments to its creditors, (ii) conditions are attached to the assistance such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound budgetary policy and (iii) the assistance is indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of the euro area as a whole. However, the euro crisis only started to calm down when the Ecb announced its outright Monetary transaction (oMt) programme allowing unlimited purchase of state bonds with a maturity of between one and three years on the condition of the adoption of an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. 77 Thus, now there is a new fourth pillar in the economic governance, which applies when the implementation of the three other pillars do not suffice to prevent a Member State from experiencing serious financial stability difficulties. The revision, done with the simplified treaty revision procedure, added a third paragraph to Article 136 tFEU providing that: "The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict 
A. tHE PoSSIbILItIES oF ASSIStANcE
If a Member State of the Eurozone needs assistance to stabilize its financial situation, 78 it can address a request to the European Stability Mechanism which foresees several possibilities: a precautionary conditioned credit line or an enhanced conditions credit line, a loan for the specific purpose of recapitalizing the national financial institutions, a loan without specific purpose, the purchase of the Member State's bonds on the primary market, and operations on the secondary market in relation to the state's bonds. 79 Such assistance is conditioned by the adoption of a macroeconomic adjustment programme by the requesting state.
b. dEcISIoN oN FINANcIAL ASSIStANcE ANd tHE
MAcroEcoNoMIc AdJUStMENt ProGrAMME The reforms of economic governance led to an adaptation of the institutions in charge of its implementation. At the national level, EU law imposes minimal quality requirements for the institutions involved in economic governance and these requirements are stricter for the Member States of the euro area. At the EU level, a new euro institutional constellation has been established: the ministerial bodies of the euro area have been substantially strengthened, new bodies have been created for the ESM and, to a lesser extent, new roles have been given to parliamentary bodies.
A. NAtIoNAL INStItUtIoNAL FrAMEWorK
Initially, EU requirements related to national institutions involved in economic governance were very weak. They mainly relate to the provision of statistics and were minimal, as Eurostat did not enjoy extensive investigation power, and no clear sanctions were provided in case of statistics manipulation. When the need for good national institutions was recognized, EU law increased quality requirements. In 2009, a new regulation on national fiscal statistics was adopted and was revised in 2010 to increase the investigation power of Eurostat. 88 In 2011, the sixpack required minimum quality for the budgetary framework defined as 'the set of arrangements, procedures, rules and institutions that underlie the conduct of budgetary policies of general government'. 89 Thus, all Member States must have in place public accounting systems subject to internal control and independent audits, adopt realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts and establish a credible, effective medium-term budgetary framework. 90 In 2013, the two-pack strengthened the institutional requirements specifically for the eurozone countries. First, they must apply a common budgetary timeline with three main deadlines: adoption of a national medium-term fiscal plan in April, of a draft budget in october, and of the budget by the end of the year. 91 Second, they must establish national fiscal councils, independent from the budegtary authorities, 92 with three main tasks: producing or endorsing macroeconomic forecasts and possibly budgetary forecasts, monitoring compliance with national numerical fiscal rules, and monitoring the implementation of the national automatic correction mechanism in case of violation of the fiscal rules. 93 
b. EU INStItUtIoNAL FrAMEWorK
In 1997, an informal coordination body between the Eurozone Finance Ministers was established, the Euro Group. 94 over time, the governmental and parliamentary bodies involved in EU economic governance, in particular at the EMU level, were stepped up.
regarding governmental bodies, the coordination of the eurozone countries has been strengthened at three levels. At the top, a Euro Summit composed of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States whose currency is the euro and chaired for 2.5 years Article 2(1a) regulation 473/2013. The independence of independent fiscal council requires a statutory regime grounded in national law, nomination procedures based on experience and competence, and adequacy of resources and appropriate access to information, freedom to communicate publicly in a timely manner. In the context of the national data protection authority, the court of Justice has interpreted strictly the independence requirement and decided that it was not contrary to democratic legitimacy: case c-518/07 Commission v. Germany by an elected President, was established by the tScG. 95 At the ministerial level, the Eurogroup had a more stable elected presidency for 2.5 years in 2005, was consolidated with an explicit legal basis introduced by the Lisbon treaty in 2009, 96 and a full-time president is now envisaged. 97 At the preparatory level, the Euro Working Group, which is composed of the representatives of the Eurozone countries at the Economic and Financial committee, is now chaired by a full-time and brussels-based President. 98 Some specific bodies were also established for the European Stability Mechanism. The main decisional body is the board of Governors which adopts the most important decisions such as the granting of financial assistance. It is composed of the finance ministers of the contracting Parties and chaired by a President elected by qualified majority of its members or by the Eurogroup President. Most of its decisions are adopted by mutual agreement. 99 However, some decisions are adopted by qualified majority, which is defined as 80% of the votes cast and weighted according to the Member State's financial contribution to the ESM. 100 because the recent reforms of economic governance considerably strengthened the commission, the council and the Eurogroup's oversight over national fiscal and socio-economic policies, it was important to increase the role of parliamentary bodies to ensure the legitimacy and the acceptability of the new rules. Thus, the four pillars of the economic governance provide for an 'economic dialogue' between, on the one hand, the relevant committees of the European Parliament and, on the other hand, the President of the council, the commission, the President of the European council or the President of the Eurogroup. The dialogue may also take place between the European Parliament and the Member State concerned by a measure adopted on the basis of economic governance rules. 101 Moreover, representatives of the commission may be invited to the national parliament of the Member State concerned. 102 Finally, the tScG sets up a conference of representatives of the relevant committees of the European Parliament and representatives of the relevant committees of national Parliaments to discuss the coordination and surveillance of fiscal and economic policies. Ibid., Points 7 and 8.
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Article 5(6) tESM.
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Article 4(5) to (7) and Article 5(7) tESM. As the contribution of Germany or France is above 20%, each of those states has a veto right in a vote by qualified majority. The evolution of EU economic governance over the last 20 years has been remarkable, especially in the last three years, and will probably have broader consequences on the three issues raised by the editors of this anniversary issue: the sources of EU law, the enforcement mechanisms, and the regulatory models.
A. SoUrcES oF EU LAW
to analyse the legal sources of economic governance, a distinction should be made between the acts which establish the governance and those used to implement the governance. on the one hand, the establishment of EU economic governance is mainly based on the tFEU and regulations adopted by the council and, since the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, by the council and the European Parliament. It is also based on international treaties such as the tESM agreed by 17 Member States and the tScG agreed by 25 Member States. The conclusion of international treaties between some Member States is allowed under EU law when the contracting parties respect their EU obligations. 104 Those treaties may even entrust tasks to the EU institutions when those tasks do not alter the essential character of the powers conferred on those institutions by EU law. 105 International treaties concluded by some Member States have advantages over EU primary law as they do require unanimity, as well as over EU secondary law as they can be negotiated quickly between the governments of contracting parties without the EU institutions and they enjoy a higher symbolic value. but they also have drawbacks: they complicate the legal landscape, they need to be ratified by the contracting Parties which may delay their application and, more importantly, they bypass the EU decision making-process -being treaty revision or enhanced cooperation -with their inherent checks and balances protecting the interests of the Union and all its Member States, and they risk undermining the legal integrity of the EU. 106 This is the reason why the tScG and the tESM contain consistency clauses with EU law, and the tScG foresees . craig, 37 European Law Review (2012 ), p. 238 and M. ruffert, 48 CMLRev. (2011 ), p. 1789 its progressive integration within the EU legal framework (which already started with the two-pack).
on the other hand, the implementation of EU economic governance relies mainly on recommendations proposed by the commission and adopted by the council. Those recommendations do not have direct binding effect as their violation cannot lead to an infringement case before the court of Justice. However, they have indirect binding effect as their violation may lead to an investigation by the commission and the imposition of sanctions by the council. As in other EU fields (such as electronic communications), the recommendations have important legal effect through ad hoc sanction procedures. Thus, economic governance recommendations have fewer binding effects than those of the hard law but more binding effects than those of the (standard) soft law. to make a parallel with the typology between hard, smart and soft power used in international relations, economic governance recommendation is smart law.
Economic governance is also implemented through sui generis legal instruments which tend to contractualize the relationship between the EU and its Members. Each year, Member States submit a stability/convergence programme, a national reform programme and, for the eurozone countries, a draft budgetary plan. Those are commitments taken by the Member State vis-à-vis the EU on its fiscal, economic and employment policies. Moreover, a Member State must submit and receive approval from the council on an economic partnership programme when it is subject to an excessive deficit procedure, a corrective action plan when it is subject to an excessive imbalance procedure, and a macroeconomic adjustment programme when it receives financial assistance. In the socio-economic coordination pillar, it is now envisaged that Member States may conclude with the EU a contract of structural reforms in exchange for financial incentives. 107 In this latter case, the contractualization model will not only be based on sanctions but also on incentives. Those contracts enable a better national ownership and allow for more detail in the recommended policy reforms, but their legal nature remains very unclear.
b. ENForcEMENt MEcHANISMS
The enforcement mechanisms used by economic governance present two main differences compared with the standard enforcement based on sanctions decided by courts. The first difference is that enforcement of economic governance rules is mainly based on voluntary actions by Member States and peer pressure and, only as a last resort, on sanctions. Unfortunately, the last decade shows that such an enforcement system is not very effective. This is why the recent reforms improve national ownership by requiring a minimum quality for national fiscal institutions, the establishment of a national correction mechanism (in parallel to the excessive deficit procedure) and the coordination of policies during the first semester of the year before the adoption of national decisions during the second semester. recent reforms also increase the possibilities of sanctions which may be imposed earlier in the excessive deficit procedure, and also during the annual multilateral surveillance.
The second difference is that the sanctions are not decided by independent courts, but are proposed by the commission and decided by the council. There may be good reasons not to subject the fiscal policy to the adjudication of a court, but that leads to political bargaining as the German and French cases showed in 2003. Thus here again, the last decade shows that such enforcement is not very effective. This is why the recent reforms limit the possibilities of bargaining in order to achieve a degree of objectivity and independence expected from a court. Within the commission, an extensive habilitation has been granted to the commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the euro to limit pressure of the Member States on commissioners. 108 Within the council, most sanctions are now decided under reverse qualified majority which substantially increases the probability of adoption. 109 And the new national sanction mechanism foreseen by the tScG is automatic and monitored by independent fiscal councils.
c. rEGULAtorY INNoVAtIoN
When the EMU was established, its economic part was based on an original governance model because, on the one hand, the standard model of hard law decided by the council and the European Parliament and controlled by the court of Justice was not politically acceptable and, on the other hand, full sovereignty of the Member State was not any more economically sustainable given the cross-countries externalities created by the common currency. At the time, economic governance was thus based on two main pillars: multilateral surveillance of fiscal policies with peer pressure and sanction as a last resort, and coordination of economic policies based on the soft open Method of coordination. The last decade shows that this original regulatory model does not work: fiscal policies were, and still are, not sustainable in many Member States and convergence did not take place.
Given such failures, our political leaders could have decided not to be innovative and follow what happens in most federal states by integrating their economic policies. Instead, they continue to rely on the original model decided on in Maastricht and try to fix it by deepening and enlarging its pillars. That led to governance now based on four pillars: multilateral surveillance of fiscal policies with more possibilities of more automatic sanctions, a new multilateral surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances, a coordination of economic policies which continues to be based on the soft open Method of coordination and financial assistance under conditions. Those pillars are implemented with recommendations (whose legal effects are situated below those of the hard law but above those of the soft law), contractual arrangements between the EU and its members, and sanctions decided in practice by the commission.
The future will tell whether this enhanced governance will be solid enough to ensure the sustainability of national public finances and economic convergence between Member States, and ultimately the sustainability of the euro area. I have my doubts because the current reforms do not address the fundamental weakness of the EMU which is that a common currency union needs a budget and fiscal power at the level of that union. 110 but I also have concerns because the current governance suffers important legitimacy gaps 111 which may lead to a rejection of the new rules. More crucially, those gaps can stop EMU integration, although that is probably the only way forward to keep the common currency in the long run and, more generally, to keep the EU construction alive. 
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